All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation by Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark

Author:Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark [Whitlark, Rachel Elizabeth]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: Political Science, Public Policy, Social Security, History, Military, Nuclear Warfare, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781501760358
Google: twQQEAAAQBAJ
Publisher: CornellUP
Published: 2021-11-15T20:48:07+00:00

Confounding Considerations for the Gulf War

Despite the evidence just described, potential confounding factors are worth addressing. First, one might argue that the Bush administration possessed an excessively convivial decision-making style, leading the administration to meet all key players’ goals with the Persian Gulf invasion and a bureaucratic political logroll. The record, however, does not support this notion. In most foreign policy circumstances, it is rare that a true consensus actually develops among the key players. Elsewhere scholars have demonstrated that Bush’s presidential style was to listen to his advisers debate the issue at hand and then choose his preferred strategy. Bush proceeded in this way with the decision making on Iraq; there was no singular administration view of the best strategy forward.72

Prior to the invasion, President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft traveled to Bush’s home at Walker’s Point to discuss the US response to Iraq’s actions. While the two were fishing on August 23, 1990, their discussions centered on the fact that not everyone on the national security team shared the president’s view that it was time to consider using force to drive Hussein out of Kuwait. Secretary of State Baker was reluctant to contemplate the use of force, as he favored diplomacy and sanctions to complete the job. When the decision was finally made for force, Baker did not shy away; he simply would have preferred more time to let the nonmilitary means run their course. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, on the other hand, recognized that sooner or later the mission would require force; in many ways he was ahead of the military planners. Cheney’s key concern was ensuring that the operation could be successful. Until he was certain of success, he would not advocate strongly for this option.73 The military itself did not try to avoid force, though Chairman Powell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having learned the negative lessons of Vietnam like most members of his generation, wanted to ensure that the job was done correctly and without complicating half-measures.74 Baker and Powell were alike in preferring dealmaking to confrontation and containment to preventive action. Powell, though, did not ultimately advocate containment, recognizing that patience was not the order of the day. While neither was thrilled with the decision to intervene, once the decision was made both supported the president and his determination.75 In the end, it was President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft who led the charge for military intervention, with Bush ultimately acting as “decider-in-chief.”

Second, one might argue that the Bush administration did not see the consideration or use of preventive military force against Iraq’s nuclear program as necessary given doubts that the program would succeed. Jacques Hymans explores the degree of internal institutionalization across states to explain their proliferation efficiency and suggests that Hussein’s nuclear program would have failed even without repeated US military interventions.76 Hymans relates that, before the Gulf War, US estimates on Iraq’s nuclear time line ranged from six months to ten years.77 Details of the regime’s

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